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D. F. Sarmiento, Deputy to the National Congress for the Province of San Juan—to General Don Justo José de Urquiza, Conqueror at Caseros.

Yungay, Oct. 13th, 1852.

My Distinguished General—

Formerly an obscure co-operator in the enterprise of organizing our Country, which Y. E. purposes to carry into effect; admitted at one period to your councils, and spontaneously separated from them since I considered unwarranted the course of policy pursued, I returned voluntarily to my old expatriation, so as to preserve practically uncontaminated the purity of the principles, of which I had been for ten years the organ, and at the same time not to be dragged along by the movements and difficulties that I foresaw in germ.

Not being one of your supporters, General, and not having chosen to become an oppositionist, allow me to break the decorous silence which I had assumed, in the name of that *honourable patriotism* which Y. E. recognised in me, and which you had the condescension to mention to myself two days before the battle of Caseros. Since then to the present, I have done nothing, General, to render me unworthy of these gratifying epithets. For the future, be assured I will do nothing to belie such honourable precedents. This is my ambition, General; an ambition, believe me, to which many of those who surround you, and allow you to be misled, because it is their interest not to give offence,—do not aspire.

We were at first, and I yet flatter myself with the belief, that we still are agreed, as to the fundamental points of the possible organization of the Republic. We have only disagreed as to the means. It was my opinion, long before Y. E. had occasion to form one, that the Government which succeeded that of Rosas, was bound to throw a veil over the aberrations of which he had been the instigator. In 1845 I expressed these ideas thus:—"Besides to fancy that communities become criminal, and that misled men are utterly perverted, who assassinate when there is a tyrant who impels them to it,—is to misapprehend human nature. All depends on the prejudices that predominate at certain moments; and the man who to-day fanatically gluts himself with blood, may yesterday have been an innocent devotee, and may to-morrow be a good citizen, when the excitation that produced the crime has disappeared........ I do not say among the partizans of Rosas, but among the very *mazhorqueros* there are virtues, incrusted with external crimes, that might some day merit reward."

I expressed these ideas, on one occasion I recollect, in the presence of Don Elias Bedoya, now your Councillor of State; I have reproduced them in all my subsequent writings, and have always made them the basis of the policy which I recommended to the communities and Governments. In this leniency, which springs, not from sentimentality, but from the study of history, Y. E. was included, General; for can it be denied that your previous public life required the indulgence of history?

But the adoption of these simple principles, had for its object the interests of the Country, and not the gratification of personal preferences or interests. It aimed at availing itself of all the men of merit embraced in the parties, and rendering them subservient to a general organization.

Recent events, and the series of oscillations that have succeeded the battle of Caseros, render once more problematical that longed for organization. Buenos Ayres and Corrientes are in arms against the new order of things, and on the one side and on the other, I see names that would confound me, were I not beforehand aware of the inevitable effects of perfectly natural causes. How does it happen, General, that the revolution of Buenos Ayres is headed by General Piran, your most faithful servant, your right hand; and that the Province of Corrientes is presided by Mr. Pujol, formerly the minister of General Virasoro, and the Aulic Counsellor of Y. E.?

I explain these apparently strange facts, by others of a similar character that I behold. How was it possible to commit the fatal error of confiding the Government of Buenos Ayres to our friend Galan, your Entre Riano Minister for the last ten years; an excellent man, and a faithful servant of Y. E. it is true, but obscure in Buenos Ayres, unknown to all, and consequently destitute of sympathies? How is it that I see figure in the Congress, as Deputies named by the Provinces, your good and submissive Secretary, Don Angel Elias, Segui my good friend, but your confectioner of publications; Leiva your former Entre Riano Minister; that little Huergo, who joined us at the encampment of Cabral, and who, from his youth and complaisance, became your aid-de-camp and mess-mate, and two of the ex-Ministers, who have followed you, General, through all your subsequent mutations of policy? Why then do I see in the Government, in the Congress, and in the very opposition, a sort of domestic servilism,—Galan, Segui, Piran, Pujol, Elias, little Huergo, our very messmates at Palermo and the Diamante, the very parties who surrounded the tent of Y. E.? And the federal Generals, where are they? And the unitarians,—where are they?

What! Is there not in Buenos Ayres a federal of that Province, a General Guido, a General Pacheco, a Colonel Costa, Lagos, and a thousand others, to whom to confide the Government, nominally if you will, so as to save appearances, so as not to wound the susceptibilities of that community; and placing your old minister, your devoted servant, Galan, at the head of the troops?

Here is the error, General; but this error was the necessary consequence of a series of preceding errors, and which I wish briefly to note in passing, that you may avoid them for the future, should you succeed in triumphing over the resistance of Buenos Ayres; because if you persist in them, the public peace, order, and the constitution which it is purposed to give, will be the stone of Sysiphus, which will be rolling back upon you every moment, and your whole life will be spent in the torment which Rosas imposed upon himself for the same purpose, and with the same result, namely to delay your downfall, heaping absurdity upon absurdity, and opening abyss under abyss. Be not deceived, General, the same causes produce the same effects. Allow me always to be candid.

The history of communities can seldom present such a phenomenon as that exhibited by the Argentine Republic in 1851. In Buenos Ayres and in the Provinces, among the old unitarians and the federals, among the populace and the chiefs that supported Rosas, the same conviction prevailed, namely, the inutility, the injustice, the absurdity, and the impracticability of the system of Rosas. The person of Rosas would have been admitted, even with his detestable precedents, had he changed his system; if for the falsity of all his pretensions he had substituted a reality, that is to say, peace, security of person and property, and above all, confidence in the future, of which he had deprived them, by the eternal necessity of struggling.

Patriotic writers had for many years been studying the interests of the Republic, soothing the rancour of party, and operating a slow but certain reaction against the practices of his Government, against the uselessness of his violent acts, and the fatality, sterility and absurdity of his designs. To the honor of Y. E. it must be said, that Y. E. did not fail to experience the salutary effect of these labours. Your public acts show this. Accordingly the foolish question of federals and unitarians was transformed into an economical question of the navigation of rivers, public roads, &c. Upon this ground, so opportunely and so long beforehand prepared, the old parties were able to drop their rancour, the very tools of the tyranny of Rosas were enabled to place themselves at the front of the regeneration of the Republic.

Guided by these notions of common sense, and perfectly aware of the state of public opinion, in May 1850 I took the liberty of addressing Y. E., pointing out what we expected from your patriotism, and proffering you the frank and sincere co-operation with which you might reckon on our part.

The results corresponded to these anticipations. Rosas, like a decayed tree, survived his fall, because a gentle breeze did not arise, to make him fall by his own weight; and if the Provinces and the Governors of the interior did not co-operate to his fall, allow me, General, to tell you, it was merely from the want of prevision, diligence, and sagacity on the part of their counsellors. I remained two months in the Capital of Brazil, in almost intimate intercourse with the Statesmen of that Nation, and I know all the details, General, and the compacts and stipulations by which Y. E. entered into the league against Rosas. All these, still unknown to the public, are matters of history, and recorded in the Ministries of Foreign Relations of Brazil and the Uruguay.

Well, General, in March 1851, you had arrangements concerted with the garrison of Montevideo, already irrevocably secured against Oribe, by the arms, clothing, ammunition and subsidies that had been procured; you had secured moreover, by treaties with Brazil, one hundred thousand hard dollars per month, for the expenses of the war; the cooperation of an army of sixteen thousand veteran troops, that were to enter the Oriental territory, *with Y. E., without Y. E., or against Y. E.*—Do you remember these words, General? The note that contains them must be in some corner of your despatch. You had moreover at your disposal eight steamers, transports *ad libitum*, and every thing else that could be collected to ensure the result.

These elements of triumph were what you should have made known to the Governors of the Provinces, a selfish race, and whose hesitation should have been removed, by an appeal to their interest, the only passion that moved them. To secure the result, officious agents should have been employed, as they are employed in all cases, discussing, examining matters, and smoothing difficulties. I had done so in the case of Benavides, who was very well disposed. I did so with the Governors of Rioja, Tucuman, Catamarca, and Jujuy, who only asked a support. But what must have been the bewilderment of these men, when one day glancing accidentally in the *Gaceta* of Buenos Ayres, they find that General Urquiza sent them a circular, delivered to Rosas by Saravia, in which he offered them the assistance *of the EntreRiano lances!* The Governors immediately sent Rosas his nomination as Supreme Chief, as the only becoming reply to such fanfaronade. From that moment Benavides turned against Dr. Rawson, and all those who laboured in San Juan in favour of General Urquiza, persecuting with fines, imprisonment, and threats of murder the Chamber of Representatives, that laboured in the same sense.

The battle of Monte Caseros, then, should not have taken place, for nobody, neither Rosas himself, nor his Chiefs, nor his soldiers wished to resist. Rosas said so on the eve of the battle. "I am abandoned by all; the people hate me; because my Generals and my brothers have plundered them: and my Generals abandon me, because they are rich and wish to preserve their fortunes."

What hopes germinated in all minds from the fall of Rosas! What anticipations for the future! What a clear perception of our wants! At the Rosario, before the Army entered the territory of Buenos Ayres, I witnessed with pleasure this universal sentiment in the masses, in the army, in the chiefs, in the vanquished, and in the victors. All that accumulation of absurdities was about to disappear; but........

We arrive at Buenos Ayres, and the victorious General persists in making the citizens—who, full of enthusiasm and gratitude, flocked in thousands, almost to kiss his feet,—pick up from the mire, the detested, the despicable, the ignominious red rag, which they had trampled on the 4th of February, as the evidence that they were then free. This insignificant act is the chief cause of all the ills that followed. It is the nature of communities to act by reactions. The *red ribbon* of Rosas was despotism, the *mashorca*, barbarity, humiliation, every thing. To impose it, was to chill enthusiasm, to excite discontent, to create division and apprehension for the future. All was lost, all was placed in doubt. The people went and came. They would not believe their own eyes; they still hoped. On presenting myself on the 5th February, on my arrival at Palermo with the army, that excellent and timid youth Gorostiaga, with an accent of sorrow remarked to me,—"This ribbon, Sir, we can never again wear; Buenos Ayres will resist in mass." I replied, "resist and you are safe." Three days afterwards he was Minister, and wore the ribbon, at the same time that the Provisional Government, with the previous concurrence of the General, declared its use not obligatory. On the day of the triumphal entry, Y. E. enjoyed the delirium of that immense population, crowded on the house-tops, in the windows, at the doors, and on the side walks, so as to impede our passage; but you will also recollect that your eyes, sparkling with rage, did not find a single red ribbon in all the triumphal march, and that the thousands of nosegays, flags and drapery, exhibited the national colours and not the red.

Buenos Ayres, then, on that day, gave a public, solemn, and unanimous vote. She loved the General and federal principles, but she did not wish a continuance of the farces, of the outrages of Rosas. She chose the man, but not the system. Y. E. yourself admitted so on that day, when all your intimates, little Huergo included, had the courage to repeat something of what I said to your son, Don Diogenes, at the door of Your Excellency's apartment, respecting the evils about to result from that pertinacity. I had before remarked the same thing to Don Angel Elia; but as he fears you so much, it is probable he may not have said any thing; and if I did not speak to Y. E. at Gualeguaychú, when repeated hints were given to me through the medium of Elia, Ponsati, and Colonel Basavilbaso, to put on the despicable badge, it is because I do not take hints when dignity is concerned. If you wished me to put on that bauble, why did not the General, who conversed with me daily on matters of policy, tell me so distinctly, knowing that I pay little heed to *insinuations?*

What did the General, after the ovation of the 20th February, so spontaneous, so cordial, but so becoming the City of Buenos Ayres? He spat in her face, by the proclamation composed by Segui (now a Deputy); insulting, calumniating the Government, outraging truth, inciting to division, introducing the foul epithet *ruthless unitarians!* From that day no one was deceived!

The army was composed of diverse elements. The Orientals were they who had resisted Rosas and his system at Montevideo. The Correntinos were the same who had followed the standards of the illustrious Lavalle and Paz: Generals Medina, Lamadrid, Lopez, Madariaga, Abalos, and more than a hundred other superior officers of the same precedents, served against the system. The proclamation, then, offended the entire population of Buenos Ayres, offended the army that had fought for a different object, destroyed confidence, and left the future in uncertainty.

Y. E. recollects the position I held in the army, and might have seen, at the Rosario and Palermo, the estimation in which I was held. A friend of Y. E., and with honourable antecedents of personal character, I was the confidant, I may say, of all the elements of the army, even of the circle that surrounded you and ate at your table. This situation enabled me to observe the fatal effects that I had foreseen, and to anticipate the disappointment of every hope. Without consulting any one, I then adopted my resolution. I retired into voluntary exile.

That measure, apparently insignificant, was interpreted by popular instinct, in its true acceptation; a continuation of the old arbitrary system, now in the name of the constitution, as it had formerly been in that of the federation.

The Provinces required redress. They remained, even after the triumph, oppressed by the same chieftains that Rosas had placed over them. The most trivial policy counselled the letting them fall by the weight of the circumstances, or to notify their separation; the victorious General guaranteeing their life, property, and even liberty. We had moral power for this and much more. Saravia left the Government, Mallea was deposed, and Benavides had his resignation written out, when Irigoyen, the former agent of Rosas arrived, telling them—"The same as Rosas—The person of Urquiza is the only change that has been made." A letter of Señor Irigoyen was received in Valparaiso, written from San Luis to Mendoza, and remitted from thence, which contains these very ideas. I should like to have witnessed the amazement of the communities, that of Benavides himself, as it was described to me by letters. It was the game of *the winner loses*.

But though there may be wags who amuse themselves with these farces, the natural course of things brings its consequences. Despite the envoys, in contravention of the order received, Mendoza, San Juan, Cordova, Tucuman, Salta, Jujuy, Corrientes deposed their Governors, for the same reason that those of Santa Fé and Buenos Ayres had been deposed. The General was derided, and therefore provoked, and avenged himself on San Juan, the community most enthusiastic in favor of the General, as for two years before his name appeared on the scene, I presented him to them as the future saviour of the Republic. Rawson in fetters, placed by the hand of Benavides, by the order of Urquiza, is the most instructive of the ironies of human history! But what the General does not perceive, from his inattention to the study of history, is that his name was tarnished by all these measures. It no longer inspires confidence, either in his friends or in his enemies. His most solemn promises do not carry with them the accent of sincerity, which alone gives them power. Your name, Sir, at the beginning, was the rallying point of the old parties, the certain guarantee of the future. Now, it is nothing; it will be what chance or force give it: but as chance and force are

not Y. E., they may cease to be on your side, as you unfortunately begin to feel.

And in this policy of disenchantment, of the winner loses, imposed upon the Provinces, it cannot be said that circumstances have impelled you to it. No: it was a settled purpose; an ambuscade imported ready-made from Entre Rios. As upon the marches I had my place assigned me at two steps distance from General Virasoro, and in the encampments my tent was erected at ten yards from his, we talked of it with our friend Galan, with Basavilbaso, Piran, Pujol, and the others who enjoyed the confidence of Y. E.—Moreover when at Palermo I went to request my separation from the service, Y. E. remarked to me; »I do not leave Saravia in the command;" to which I replied, "and Benavides, Sir, does he remain?» »He is so despicable a man,»rejoined Y. E.—To which I only answered, "but the Province of San Juan, Sir, which is so devoted to us, is not despicable.» I did not insist farther, for I knew that the decision had been adopted, and if I now reproduce the very terms, it is not to prejudice Benavides. No fear. Birds of a feather flock together; and if that was really a venting of spleen, Y. E. owed it to Benavides, for worse things printed in his proclamations against Y. E.

It now remains to speak of the affairs of Buenos Ayres, which present so alarming an aspect. Those are now called *agitators* who cannot, as formerly, be called *ruthless unitarians*. But it is necessary to inform you of precedents, of which Y. E. is not aware. When we arrived at Buenos Ayres, the foundations of all the subequent difficulties were already laid by Y. E., or by your counsellors. You came resolved to make the waters run upwards, and the water is silly enough always to run downwards. This is all. Nobody wished to resist. Such was the faith in the force of things, that all said, let us hope, let us await, every thing must yet go right. I was the only one, General, who wished to resist. I knew what came prepared, and I also knew the means we possessed of attacking the evil before it had developed itself. When one sees the puppets behind the screen, he comprehends things that the stultified public cannot explain, believing that the puppets really speak and play their antics.

To avoid details I will merely transcribe extracts of letters from Colonel Mitre and Dr. Velez, two of those banished in June, for having opposed the projects of Y. E.—two agitators. With date the 1st May the latter wrote to me at Rio Janeiro: "I ac"cept and greatly respect your principle, "*and he would not drink*; but in the actual »circumstances it may admit of extenuations. »To-day the first number of the »Nacional» »makes its appearance, written by myself "and Pedro Ortiz, and other youths of the "the Provinces. General Urquiza favours »us with a good subscription. In his quality "of a provincial, we have a community of "views and interests with him for the organi"zation of the Country."

Colonel Mitre, with date the 13th April, wrote to me:—"This gets on better than "when you left us. The General has taken "a new track, and has surrounded himself by "other councils, which he listens to and fol"lows. On the 11th inst., the elections take "place. I am sorry you are not here, as you "would have been a Deputy for Buenos »Ayres, and in that position might have "better served the Country than protest »ing single-handed, and leaving your com»panions compromised in a different route, »which, good or bad, must conduct us to the »end of our march."

As Y. E. sees, Drs. Velez and Ortiz, provincials, and Colonel Mitre, a Porteño, coincided with Y. E., and disapproved my conduct. But as I follow an internal light, independent of human vicissitudes, instead of going to Buenos Ayres, whither they called me, with the consent of Y. E., I embarked on the 18th May for Chile. I had hardly disembarked at Valparaiso, when Velez, Ortiz, Mitre, your friends, your supporters down to the moment of my departure, were banished, as disturbers of the peace! as anarchists!

How are these anomalies to be explained? With the same key that explains all the rest;—the aberration of Your Excellency's policy. The Provincials, the Porteños, your friends, your enemies, federals and unitarians, all wished one thing, security for the future. Y. E. wishes, although you do not say so, I will not say the contrary, but merely to have your own way. You do not bear in mind the consequences of this. And the fatal, inevitable, awful consequences ensue.

The Representatives of the Province of Buenos Ayres were elected. How? In the presence of three thousand men of the veteran force, that Y. E. sent to the electoral tables, exhibiting their knives. Nevertheless the people of Buenos Ayres gained the elections.

What did the General then do, not being able to deny the legality of the elections? In a toast at the breakfast table, he dictated to the Chamber of Representatives the candidate they were to elect as Governor.—"To the health, said you, of Don Vicente Lopez, as Governor, for this is the wish of the army!" And you caused the toast to be published.

The Chamber appointed the person dictated to it in so gastronomical a manner, and the author of the toast had his way. Then the army, General Piran your old counsellor and friend, and the public itself looked on in silence, saying to themselves, "is it thus the promised Constitution is to be respected? Is it at a breakfast table the fate of the Country is to be decided?"—Nevertheless they still said, "let us hope, this man may reform."

The Governors of the Provinces are convoked at San Nicolas; an indiscreet step, which discovered your design. The same would have been effected by assembling deputies of the Governments, in order at least to save appearances: but to bring together Lucero, Benavides, Gutierrez, and Lopez, to take out these insects from the decayed trunk, was to provoke reactions in San Juan, Tucuman and Cordova. If you remove the ligaments, how can you expect the parts to remain united? And as if these examples were still insufficient, Y. E. commits a similar blunder in now absenting yourself from Buenos Ayres. What was compressed rises up, the weight it had upon it being removed.

The nomination of the Deputies by Provinces, was another of the useless outrages to common sense. The constant practice from 1810, the concurrent usage of all the nations of the earth, decide that the deputies to a congress shall be in proportion to the population. How was it possible to give ten Argentines in Rioja the same voice as ten thousand in Buenos Ayres? Would it be alleged that it is proper to make the Provincial interests prevail in the Constitution? But this might have been effected without committing absurdities. Let us give ten deputies to Buenos Ayres, and only two to each of the Provinces. It is clear that we will form a majority of the provincials of twenty six to ten, and that we can carry every vote. But the end aimed at was different. It was wished to have a *small* Congress, that might be held in the hand, and managed by means of Angel Elia: it was meant to have it in a corner, where all-seeing themselves unprotected and without guarantees, might yield to *insinuations*. In fine, it was meant that there should be few men of capacity, knowing that they are rare in the Provinces.

All rules were set at nought, and caprice had its way. But the scenes of July were prepared: and he who now takes the field with a Congress composed of four insignificants, placed three thousand men in the Retiro barracks the day the compact of San Nicolas was to be discussed, and, as the acme of imprudence, had not the prevision to tie the hands of the Chamber of Buenos Ayres, the same as the Chambers of the Interior Provinces, depriving them before hand of their right, and I add duty, to discuss, reject or ratify what their Governors may have done.

And accordingly, from measure to measure, and from outrage to outrage, the Liberator at last found himself without a man to whom he could confide the Government, and was compelled to assume it himself. This act, which Y. E. must have considered your definitive triumph, was only the brink of the principice. From that moment you openly violated the solemn compact, in virtue of which Brazil had delivered to you its army, its navy, its treasures. "Art. 2d—The Allies engage to leave Buenos Ayres at entire liberty to adopt the Government she may deem most expedient, &c"—(I quote from memory.)

But all this is nothing, compared with the moral effects produced on the opinion of all. Who that is aware of these acts of violence, can believe that a real constitution is going to be given to the country, and that if given, it will be respected by a man, who at every step, and for the most frivolous motives, outrages all decency, considering the communities children, that may be dazzled with proclamations and decrees?

And now allow me to return to a cardinal point. What could induce you to delegate the Government of Buenos Ayres in Galan! We have been told here that Y. E. is a federal of the Rosas school, and that your sympathies naturally inclined to his partizans. But I am not satisfied with these easy explanations. Your interest, your selfishness, should have counselled you to rest upon what is solid. He who does not so is an idiot. Those being rejected whom Y. E. was pleased to style ruthless unitarians, that is, those who by the press, in the army, and the ranks of diplomacy, aided you in elevating yourself, you were then bound to rely on the party which Y. E. calls the federal: why did you not do so? Why were you condemned to confide the Government to Galan, your Entre-Riano Minister, your chief before the battle of Cagancha? Was it because you rule this General like a domestic? When we were reading the drafts of the bulletin of the action, No. 26, Galan having been expressly sent for, was going to suggest an alteration, when Y. E. interrupted him, saying contemptuously "hold your tongue! Go on Sarmiento!" It is true, you had formerly told me, in apologising for a similar incident in my own case—"That is my way: I often rate Galan, whom I so greatly esteem"—....Be it so; but is this the Governor you place over Buenos Ayres?—

Yes; but this is not the only cause, General. In Buenos Ayres there are none of the federals that who served Rosas who are attached to Y. E.—To parade the names of Guido, Anchorena, Costa, Reyes, Arana, Lagos, &c. &c., in your government, is only a display to dazzle others, perhaps to deceive yourself, and to conceal the fact that your power is in the air, that it has no basis, that you are alone. Why did you not call to the ministry Arana, or Lagos, or Guido, or Garcia, when you upset the Government, and called Galan your Entre-Riano servant? Why did you give the command of the garrison of Buenos Ayres to General Piran, your old Entre-Riano Chief, and not to General Pacheco, or to some other man known in Buenos Ayres?

For the same reason that in the interstices of the Congress you have inserted Leiva, your former Entre-Riano minister; Elias, whom you worry with your dog *Purvis*, for your amusement and to persecute him, the stripling Segui, or your pet aid-de-camp Huergo; and I am surprised not to find little Lagos, Diogenes, and the rest of the family, instead of Guido, Garcia, Anchorena, Arana, and Pacheco, respectable and distinguished men, since Alsina, Portela, Velez, Dominquez, Tejedor, Sarmiento, and so many others might be stigmatised as *ruthless unitarians*.

Behold in this, Sir, the consequence of a *single blunder*, that of not listening to your disinterested friends.

Do you recollect what I told you at Gualeguaychú, when you hinted that you would retire to private life, as soon as the Republic was free? Do you remember what I replied, when you intimated to me your intention of bringing the Congress and the Government to Entre Rios, as to what Buenos Ayres weighed in the balance, and that Y. E. ought not to remove the Congress from thence? Do you recollect what I told you at the Diamante, before Mitre and Paunero, when you repeated to them the lesson which you had twice given to me before; "when we arrive at Buenos Ayres it will be necessary to execute many, or I will return home, and leave them to settle their affairs as they best may." General, I replied to you before said witnesses, I beg leave to repeat what I said at Gualeguaychú. You must do neither. Let us not anticipate respecting these matters. I know the mind of the Republic, and the spirit that prevails in it.—You will see the resistance, you replied to me—what, are you afraid, General? We shall overcome it. Where can they offer resistance, in the press, in the Chamber, in the army?—I fear! after having defied the power of Rosas! Fear of phantoms, General! Such are men." I believe you did not much like my honorable frankness; but I did not reckon that we ourselves were to embroil the matter, to have the pleasure of setting it right with cuts and thrusts.

Undeceive yourself, General: you may constitute the Republic, as you imposed the red ribbon, preserved Rosas's Governors, dissolved the Government of Buenos Ayres, and did whatever you pleased with kicks and cuffs; but how long will the imposed Constitution last?

As long as you have the power in your hands? Constitutions are not made for the mere pleasure of giving them, but for future generations. Not for the exceptional circumstances of the moment when they are given, but with a view to the future. For this reason it is requisite to surround them with all the prestige of legitimacy, independence, capacity, knowledge in those who give them, that they may be obeyed and respected. Do you fancy that to-morrow, or six years hence, men that respect themselves will venerate the burlesque work of Angel Elia, Segui, and Leiva, your blind minions; for all the rest, even the few distinguished names that appear, are only the eights and nines of the pack? Don Angel Elia is the constituter of the Republic.

All else are *legalities* in the Rosas style, played cards, baited bulls. The real constitution of the Republic, were the seven thousand vereran troops with which you had Buenos Ayres blockaded, from February to September, and despite them, Y. E. has seen that legitimate resistance has not ceased against your *legal* snares, which have hitherto been the ground work of your policy: do you fancy it is seduction that has produced it? That General Piran has got deranged? Quite a mistake, General. These vulgar explanations are the cause of committing new blunders, When we arrived at Buenos Ayres Y. E. ordered four batallions to be formed of the mulattoes who were taken prisoners. These mulattoes rude, as they appear, had sworn not to fight, that Rosas might fall, expecting the repose of which he had deprived them for twenty years. Behold now for these unfortunates, the result of their own defeat is to see themselves enrolled anew to serve another master. But these men were Porteños, and no moral tie bound them to a person unknown, of whom they heard no person speak well. The four battalions taken from Oribe, and the four regiments of cavalry, hoped on their return to Buenos Ayres, which they had left in 1837, to see the relicts of their families, and their arrears of pay, in short to return to life. Such were the promises made to them by Y. E.

After the victory they remained penned in the marshes of Palermo, to guard the prisoner, the city of Buenos Ayres. The Correntinos came with good will, to requite the outrages committed upon them at Pago Largo, Vences, &c., by Rosas. But the country restored to freedom, their wish was to return to the bosom of their families. But the General had no confidence in the troops of Buenos Ayres, because they were Porteños, and leaves the two Correntino Battalions as guard over the city, under the command of Piran. What happens then? The press is fettered—the Chamber dissolved—the Government usurped—friends repulsed—the vanquished caressed, but no confidence reposed in them. The matter now begins from the other end. Piran sets free the Correntinos: the Correntinos, the battalions of Buenos Ayres: the battalions rescue the Chamber: the Chamber, the People; and the People will appeal to their force, to their desperation, to the example of Montevideo, victorious for nine years against Rosas, Oribe and Urquiza combined, to save themselves from falling into the hands of the "Last of the Mohicans;" the last military chieftain, General. Cast your eye over the whole Republic, and see if there remains another barbarian, created or in germ, of the school of Artigas, Ramirez, Lopez, Quiroga, Rosas, Urquiza—Is it Virasoro? Benavides? He is a poor creature, as Y. E. remarked to me. This is the immense progress made in the Argentine and Oriental Republics, by means of their revolutions. Chieftainship is defunct, extinguished for ever. There are Oribe and Rivera: the President of the Uruguay is neither Lucas Moreno, nor Venancio Flores, but Señor Giró, a civilian and landed proprietor. Y. E. once retired from the public scene, the Argentine Republic is free from its inveterate leprosy, the blood stained chieftain, debtor for a thousand lives, inventor of the most revolting punishments, the exterminator of prisoners as at Pago-Largo, Vences, and the India Muerta; carnage-covered fields, where the unfortunate *gauchos* [peasants] were butchered by battalions and regiments. Would Y. E. now dare to recount the deed of justice committed on your estate at San José, on the boy accused of stealing a red vest? It was a mockery in history to put down Rosas, who only ordered, and to raise up in his place the amateur executioner! Y. E. would have been a President, whose history must have dated from Monte Caseros, because previous to that it is dark and blood-stained—God has willed otherwise.

But in that system of compressure, cataplasms and ligatures, on which your power was founded, there was another vice which has not yet appeared, but which is inherent in it, and will appear by and by. You reckoned on the support of seven thousand men; and for what I know may still reckon on it. But seven thousand men of a standing army, assembled round Buenos Ayres to stand guard over it, must be well clothed and fed, must have promotions and hopes for the future. Seven thousand men cannot be maintained for a year by any State of South America; because their revenues are inadequate to such outlay. What must happen, should Y. E. require to retain them? They would consume the cattle, and cause *discontent anew among the landed proprietors*: they would absorb the National resources, and the Government could realize none of the promises it has made: *the communities would be undeceived*. As the rents would be insufficient, recourse would be had to emissions of paper money; *the ruin of commerce*. But as the army requires Chiefs, the Chiefs must be tampered with by bribes, after the manner of Rosas:—*the plunder of pcoperty*. And as the suffering public will complain—*persecution against the anarchists, the aspirants, and the demagogues*, and the other customary classifications. But, as intimidation cannot extend beyond the country—*complacent diplomatists, hireling writers, reputations and reclamations everywhere*. And lastly, as this system cannot fail to destroy and annihilate commerce, and compromise the interests of Europe and the United States, of Brazil, Chile, &c.,—*protests, exchange of notes and blockades* must ensue, till when all is ripe, that is, when the cord has has been stretched till it breaks, the soldiers revolt or are vanquished, and the whole superstructure topples down, and he who had reared it is either spitted on one of the bayonets which he himself had prepared, or goes to England to lament that he had not had a little more common humanity, and especially a little less confidence in what is no guarantee of duration, because it consumes, undermines and corrodes what it was meant ta uphold.

Such, General, are the inevitable consequences of the policy hitherto followed; such the theory of the resistances that have sprung up one after another, and of the numberless, strange, and unexpected ones that must continue to thwart you for the future. Have you already entered Buenos Ayres? I congratulate you thereon. But what are you going to do next? Benavides also entered into San Juan; and what has he done? Forge a signature to make people believe that he had a Minister. An ordinary and capital crime, foreseen by the law, which assigns a term of banishment for twenty years. Y. E. may not be reduced to the same extremities. You have Galan, who signs decrees, or brings a light for your cigar, as the case may be. But after all; what is to be done to regain forfeited confidence? Will you respect public opinion, law, justice, morality, re-establish liberty................ shall we end the enumeration, General?—You should have started from this point, and nothing of all that has happened and must happen, would have taken place.

What remedy, General, for the evil already done? I assure you, I reckon myself a tolerable physician, and that I cannot give a prescription in your case. The longer I feel the pulse of the situation, the more hopeless I find it. Y. E. is a lost man, irrecoverably lost. In my poor opinion, you are the last of the many victims sacrificed in our revolutions. I led the van; Alsina, Mitre, Velez and Ortiz, who disapproved my course, followed my path; Lopez, who upset them, followed in the train. He was succeeded by Generals Piran and Madariaga, and the hundreds who followed them. But, General, I see Y. E. bringing up the rear, with the very same eyes, wherewith in 1851, I saw you from this house marching against Rosas; although such an idea had never then crossed Your Excellency's mind. Are you going to appeal to the ancient cruelty, to terror, to the *mashorca*? Do not attempt these; even on the day following your entry. It would be ruin more irretrievable. Do you

not see, General, that the recollection of these useless fooleries, which only evince insignificance, is still fresh in men's minds, detested, execrated and despised.

The priest Peña in his note speaks of a chastisement for Buenos Ayres: doubtless as he chastised the Argentine legion in Montevideo in 1846, to enthrone Rivera. But how long is Buenos Ayres to be chastised? Rosas continued chastizing her for twenty years, till he himself well chastised went off to England. How many years is Y. E. to continue chastising her now? When do you expect to return to your establishment at San José? You are ruined, General, ruined! Do you reckon on the Provinces? But what have the Provinces in common with Y. E., a person unknown to them?

What hopes can they entertain from the civil war that you are kindling up for them? But do not forget that Rosas, who had the Provinces under his rod, could not in nine years vanquish Montevideo, where his enemies had entrenched themselves; and his enemies from thence stirred up Brazil against him, seduced General Urquiza, who was his Piran, deprived him of his army, and turned it against himself.

I will tell you why you are lost. It is because your accidental part has ended. Like Talien on Thermidor, you suppressed your associate and accomplice Rosas, the Argentine Robespierre; chief of the pretorian troops, you revolted against the tyrant whom you before had supported. But to succeed him it required to be an Agustus after having been an Octavius, and to have had as a basis a community extenuated by anarchy, instead of finding it, as you found the Argentine Republic, tired of the most frightful tyranny. Now, it is a rule sanctioned by history, that small tyrannies do not prosper after great ones: and another rule that two historical phases do not succeed each other in the same community. How could it enter your head, that because Anchorena, Arana, Costa and Lagos served Rosas, they must also serve Y. E.? What, are men beasts of burden, indifferent as to who may saddle them? Do you fancy that Benavides without the minor petty chiefs, who have been dethroned, will continue for ever battling, fighting and attacking, on account of whoever it may be? No, General: these are emollients, cataplasms, that amuse the fancy without curing the sore. The only remedy, the only solid support, is one that Y. E. has never dreamt of—CONFIDENCE. To restore confidence: to restore those hopes, those illusions which have been dissipated by so many absurdities, by so many fooleries. It is impossible to turn black into white. It is impossible to believe a single word you say, even though you swore it upon your knees. Segui does not believe you; Galan does not believe you; Elias does not believe you. The latter would tell you so, if he did not fear your dog Purvis. Galan would tell you so, were it not that all his interests are in your power, and on joint account with Y. E.—And Segui would tell you so, as he tells others with his accustomed frivolity, were it not that he expects and desires "money, much money," to use his own expression.

But though Y. E. cannot regain lost confidence, you may still save the future prospects of the Republic. I feel as greatly alarmed at the present dangers, as I do for those you leave prepared for the future. Attention to this is indispensable.

If you have triumphed, if you have made your sorry entry into Buenos Ayres, how sad must you have felt, General, when you compared it with that of the 20th February, so glorious, so applauded!—It matters not: if you have entered, then, order that Congress, without liberty, without dignity, without prestige to be dissolved, in order that your dependants, Elias, Segui, Leiva, Huergo, and Gorostiaga, who proclaim aloud what it really is, may not figure in it, and let a new Congress be convoked, freely elected, into which Messrs. Alberdi, Guido, Alsina, Anchorena, Lopez, Dominguez, Mitre, Lagos [Colonel], Portela, Velez, Carril, Pico; Generals Pacheco, Pinto and Oro; Aberastain, Marmol, Sarmiento, men of experience, of prestige, of authority, of intelligence, may form a part. Let it be assembled at the Rosario, and declare as Congressional territory ten leagues in circumference, under the authority of the Congress, Y. E. keeping at a distance, so as not to deprive it by your presence of all morality, of every idea of independence. Do yet more. Call the Agents of Brazil, of the Uruguay, of the United States, of France, of England, who have come to secure the commercial interests of their respective countries, and tell them—I have forfeited all confidence; anarchy has declared itself among the Chiefs of my army, and hatred in the communities. Attend at the Congress; import consideration to it; each one of you take up a vessel of war, that said Congress may not be at the mercy of the guard which I nominally place at its orders: United States, show them the way to comport themselves as federals; France, look after England, and vice versa; Brazil, take care of America; one and all, consult the lasting peace of this land, desolated for so many years, and now menaced for many more. If you think proper to assemble the Congress at Buenos Ayres, twice *subdued* in vain, disband your army, embody the National Guard, and request the aforesaid Agents to lend their assistance in maintaining order whilst the Constitution is being sanctioned. The remedy appears a little bitter; it appears heroic: but I can see no other. All the neighbouring States, the United States, France and England, are interested in that the Republic be really constituted upon a solid basis. His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil remarked to me:—"It concerns Brazil that the Argentine Republic be freely constituted: that the Congress be a power; that the Constitution be a check; in order that those Governments of Chieftains may not in the course of any night, give orders to mount thirty thousand vandals, and throw them upon our frontier. When there are responsible Ministers, and not lackeys or clerks; when there are deliberative Congresses, an opposition, a free press, voted revenues, and discussed estimates, they will then consider well before rushing into wars without a serious motive."

H. M. was right. He had scarcely elevated Y. E. by his treasures, when Y. E. *hinted* to the Government of Montevideo, that it should *disavow* the treaties celebrated with the concurrence of Y. E. personally, and offering it the support of your arms, and naming as Envoy to Brazil the very General Guido, who had so much annoyed it during the time of Rosas; and war would have broken out had not able men interfered to prevent it, and made you declare in favor of Brazil, cancel the appointment of Guido, and threaten the Government of Montevideo with the very arms you had offered it; which had to convoke the Congress to a secret session, and reveal to the members that it had received that intimation. As all this affair was managed at first through the medium of Don Diogenes, diplomatic envoy [a new practice which Y. E. introduced from Paraguay, where one son of the President is General, and another, of 15 years of age, the Admiral,] and was terminated by the priest Peña, it has been kept quiet; but the fact is certain, as written documents attest.

If you have not entered into Buenos Ayres, General; if you are besieging it, and Brazil, the United States, France and England have not mediated to prevent the useless destruction of property, the useless effusion of blood, and I say USELESS, General, because what matters it now that Y. E. enter or not? What are you now in regard to the future? zero, or an obstacle. But if you have not yet entered, General, then........I will not advise you to return home. There are few men who know when they cease to be necessary. Then, General, go on besieging, go on devastating the suburbs of Buenos Ayres, consuming cattle, impressing the peasants, killing your enemies, who after all are not Argentines but Porteños. Go on interrupting commerce, trampling down the patches of cultivation, as we did at our entry, when through mere laziness a hundred thousand horses were left for twenty days, on the little farms in the neighbourhood of Palermo. I was present when Colonel Hornos depicted, with rude but moving eloquence, the destruction caused by the horses. Sow salt upon Buenos Ayres, as you said to the Provincial Governors at San Nicolas: let Buenos Ayres be the same as Santa Fé, Rioja, San Luis, and the other cities ruled by military chieftains. Go ahead, General, leaving the camps covered with the unburied corpses of your own soldiers, as they were with those of our own and those of Rosas, when I went out—sixteen days after the battle. Were they afterwards buried?—I cannot tell. Was the corpse of Chilavert interred, or those of the hundred of the Aquino Division, who were shot or had their throats cut at Palermo, within 200 yards of the door of your habitation, and whose putrefying remains infected the air? Ten days after his execution, I went to see the body of Chilavert, swollen, disfigured, macerated and suppurating. I speak, General, of historical facts, known and witnessed by forty thousand individuals, Brazilians, Orientals, Correntinos, Santafecinos, and Buenos Ayreans. Marshall Marquez spoke to me of it with horror, wondering at a negligence, really awful to all who are not Argentines.

Why, General, did you put Chilavert to death the day following the battle, and after the interview you had with him? The whole army was thunderstruck, without being able to divine the secret cause, for there was no apparent one, why you rid yourself of Chilavert. Many days afterwards, beholding his disfigured body along with Mitre, the latter remarked to me, Whose throat can the General have cut in this poor Chilavert?—I know not, I replied to him, but I fancy that it is the scientific artilleryman, in order that his Piran may not have a rival—Was I right, General, in this conjecture? What a singular and mysterious coincidence it would be, should the three Artillerymen of the Republic, Generals Paz, Piran and Colonel Mitre be combined against Y. E.? Chilavert was the only one, from his skill and valour, that you might have opposed to them. Perhaps the bloody shade of this unfortunate man may present itself to you, General, to offer you his services and to ask you—why did you cause me to be put to death, being a prisoner of war, a soldier of the line, without any crime, though they may accuse me of weaknesses? I have served Rosas in the artillery, but not in the *mashorca*, not in his spoliations"—Who knows, General, if you do not now regret having sacrificed an artilleryman. In sieges they are more important than horses.

Go on sending exaggerated details of your forces to the Provinces. They speak of sixteen thousand men that you are now assembling against Buenos Ayres. Another rare coincidence! I, General, concocted the statement of the Liberating Army: I requested a signature, and Y. E. referred me to that of General Virasoro. I inserted 2000 imaginary men, that figure in the convoys and baggage. With Y. E. we raised the effective force, which consisted of 23,000, to 28,000. I now see that you have again 16,000 men, without the Correntinos, the Brazilians, the Orientals, and the battalions of Buenos Ayres, that is, without four of the allied armies. In very truth I am confounded at this parturition of men in the Province of Santa Fé, which did not supply a thousand in that grand crusade. General Madariaga did not command veteran troops, but militia cavalry of the suburbs of Buenos Ayres. This reminds me, General, of Hannibal's dispatches to Carthage; "I have conquered the Romans, send me troops; I have plundered their cities, send me money." Lagos now offers you his cooperation, when before he left Entre-Rios in order not to assist Urquiza: Colonel Flores who abandoned his corps in Montevideo, despite the entreaties of Y. E. at the zenith of your power, now supports you in your tottering position! Bustos who escaped from Montevideo, and was outlawed by Urquiza, along with Costa, Dominguez and Garcia, now that they can repay him, call him to take possession of Buenos Ayres! I have seen so many aberrations during these last years, that this surprises me as little as if I were told that the Emperor of Brazil had enlisted into Urquiza's army, to requite Y. E. for service rendered, "*in preserving the crown which he wears upon his head,*" as Y. E. had the impertinence to tell Señor Carneiro Leao, the Envoy Extraordinary of the Emperor, to his face; and I blushed with shame to hear said Envoy recount the irritating scene, and his commentaries upon it—"Yes, the millions wherewith we had to buy him, to upset Rosas! Even after entering into Buenos Ayres he wished us to give him a hundred thousand dollars monthly, whilst he obscured the splendour of our arms at Monte Caseros, to arrogate to himself alone the honors of the victory."

They talk of the Entre-Rianos who fly to fulfil their vow of the 1st of May? This promises to be a long matter. The Entre-Riano army is composed of militia forces, from the country districts and cities. When the order arrives for their convocation, time must be allowed for collecting them, marching to their encampments, to traverse the province, and cross the Paraná. We occupied forty days to reach Buenos Ayres. Every thing is extraodinary. Piran revolts with four battalions, stationed at the Retiro; his effective force was fifteen hundred men, and he forgets that there are five thousand at Palermo, only twelve squares distant (less than a mile); and Galan instead of falling upon him, requests orders from Santa Fé, and is commanded to attack forthwith. Meanwhile General Urquiza, invades with the Santafecinians, and harangues the peasantry of Entre-Rios, as well as those of Corrientes! —Impossible! How long will you drag that whole community, to carry on wars of extermination, without reward, without pay, without compassion? Is Entre-Rios your patrimony? Are all its inhabitants your offspring, numerous as is your illegatimate progeny?—The bell begins to sound, by which the Provinces are to be aroused. The rascally Porteños! At the Porteños! This has been the universal war-cry, from Artigas to Facundo. They forget that if Rosas or Buenos Ayres has destroyed, and annihilated, and enslaved the Provinces, it was by the hands of the provincials, Benavides, Virasoro, Lopez, and Urquiza, his blind instruments, his hired executioners.

The news of the *military mutiny* [I adopt the official phraseology] arrived at Santa Fé on the 13th; and on the 15th Y. E. ordered Galan to attack with his 5,000 men. The order must have arrived on the 17th and the action taken place on the 18th of Sept. How is it, General, that the huzzas of those who celebrate the triumph have not yet reached my ears? Has Galan not obeyed? It would not be the first instance of disobedience. Do you recollect, General, how in the Staff we laughed at Colonel Galan, that, after we of the left, (the Orientals with whom I was incorporated,) and the left of the centre, composed of Brazilians, had surrounded the house of Monte Caseros, there was no means of moving Galan with the right of the centre, with the Entre-Rianos, who had remained at four squares distance [600 yards] from the enemies line? Are you aware that Colonel Chenaut had to deceive Virasoro, giving him an order which he had not received, to make him advance, assisted by the entreaties of Brigadier Marquez, who at last advanced alone? Thus are won many of these reputations, General, that grow up in the service of military chieftains;—terrible after the defeat of their enemies. 3,000 prisoners butchered at Pago Largo; 840 at the India Muerta; 500 at Venees; 200 at Palermo after Caseros. Were they ruthless unitarians? were they traitors? were they bandits? —No, General, they were what has never yet entered the head of Y. E.—they were men, they were Argentines...they were gauchos.... they were fathers of families, husbands, sons, brothers....in short, General, they were part of the very scanty population of these countries, which you, military Chieftains, the *gauchos*, desolate; you, who are the knife of the very *gauchos* who elevate you. The ruthless unitarians did not introduce the system of *extermination* and *throat-cutting*; from the time of Artigas, Quiroga, and Rosas, Urquiza is he who has butchered most prisoners. This is matter of historical notoriety. The thong of Beron Astrada's skin was taken off by a lad who waited upon you at the table, till Elias (now a deputy) entered you service. Y. E. recounted the story, telling him, that Y. E. had offered a ring to the person who should cut off the thong, soften it, and form it into a pair of manacles; and this devil, added you, dismounted, drew his knife........&c. Elias published some thing of this strange conversation. I have served in your armies, General, and I know your Chiefs individually. Galan then, will not make the attack till Y. E. arrives, till the Santafecinians, the Entre Rianos, the Sanjuaninos, the Mendozinos arrive, and all others who have got a cacique to head them in a marauding life; in killing cattle, in cutting the throats of gauchos, in violating women. I fear you have no other part to act but that of Ramirez, who came also to Buenos Ayres, and entered and left it again; but when he wished to enter it a second time, he found the doors shut against him, when he took to the country, fought battles, gained and lost them, and at last was killed, I know not where. Who thinks of ascertaining the end of that horde of caciques?—

Your friends, General, extol the benefits which you have confered on the Provinces, by your decree, [an excellent one, as abusive and usurpative of authority] respecting the navigation of the rivers, and the National rents. Y. E., General, who was so much pleased with the "Cronica," No. 19, of the "Arjiropolis," and with "Sud America," will be pleased to tell your courtiers, in redress of the truth, that such ideas had never before crossed your mind. When Lafone purchased the first steamer, the famous "Blanco," and presented Y. E. with four shares, Y. E. rejected them with indignation, saying: "the foreign pedlars (*los carcamanes*) are now going to introduce themselves into the rivers." When Lavalle invited you to join with him, your reply was, to break with the foreigners; when relations were established between Montevideo and Y. E. in 1845, Y. E. after having admitted them, handed them over to Rosas, because they proceeded from foreigners; when I told you that I was going to bring you two French officers, you replied emphatically to me, two "carcaman" officers. In Entre-Rios the foreigner is prohibited by law from establishing himself beyond the limits of the Cities, and from acquiring rural property. There is not a single reclamation to Rosas, not a note of Y. E. to Rosas, nor a journal of Entre Rios, that speaks of the free navigation of the rivers, of Custom-houses, till after the Arjiropolis, which opened your eyes. The littoral compact provides that the Congress, and not a Governmental Commission, shall regulate the navigation of the rivers and the distribution of the rents; and Y. E., gratuitously trampling on the federal compact, and anticipating the sanction of the Congress, dictates a law, which was the public wish of Buenos Ayres [see the suppressed "Debates,"] to appropriate to yourself the honor of the thing.

Does the General imagine, that those who emit ideas may be plundered of them, as the owners of property were plundered during the time of Rosas. Y. E. will do with them in the presence of history, what the Patagonian Cacique did, who to inspire respect in an English vessel, presented himself in the long frock-coat of a protestant clergyman, and a quaker's hat. The first thing the Captain asked was:—When did you murder the owner of that dress?—

In your desperation you order the Congress to be installed, notwithstanding your absence, notwithstanding the civil war that you are about to kindle. Struggles of a drowning man, General! Deprived of the army, wherewith you intimidated the Provinces, deprived of Buenos Ayres, no other support remains for you than the phantom of a Congress, wherein your clerks and lackeys are to direct. Do you expect to deceive any one with these farces? The ideas of a Congress, of liberty, of free navigation, are recorded, General, in books, in publications anterior to the revolt against Rosas. With the names of *Arjiropolis, Comercio del Plata, Debates, Cronica, Sud America*, Civilization and Barbarity, that proclaimed them, are associated the names of Alsina, Mitre, Sarmiento, &c. Brazil, the Uruguay, Chile, France, England, and the Argentine Provinces know these names, and on not seeing them in the Congress, or by your side, and on the contrary expatriated, persecuted and in opposition to Y. E., discover all the chicanery of that phantom of a Congress, of the *legalities*, such as the re-establishment of Benavides in San Juan, and the other violent and absurd acts that ruined you. France sent Saint Georges, because he was our partizan before hand; England sent Hotham, because, General, he had fought at Obligado against Y. E.; Brazil is hostile to you, because she was the first victim of your perfidy. Whom then are you going to deceive with this joke of a Congress? Do not be childish.

It is singular that the first man who seperated himself from you was the most ardent provincial, one Sarmiento; and that Dr. Velez, a provincial, and Dr. Ortiz, a provincial, figure among the expatriated of June. It is stranger still that the Journals suspended by Y. E. in Buenos Ayres, were the "Nacional," written by provincials, and the "Debates," which reproduced the "Crónica," "Sud América," and the "Argiropolis," which are the creed of the Provinces. But the fact is there are different kinds of provincials. Provincials as Benavides, yes; Provincials as Sarmiento, no! thus it happens, General: but there are different kinds of Porteños; Porteños such as Galan and the priest Peña; such, yes: Porteños such as Piran, Chilavert and Mitre, these no! Porteños such as Elias, Deputy for Rioja, and little Huergo, Deputy for San Luis, certainly; but Porteños such as Alsina, Portela, and the obscure aspirants, no, never! Accordingly, my General, there are men for all purposes, and there need not be such jealousy of the Pro-

vinces, when Rioja and San Luis the two most provincial of the Republics have succeeded in discovering the nose of Elias, and the sorry figure of Huergo. There are even provincials who love Buenos Ayres, General. Bear in mind Palermo and the villa of Holemberg.

Nevertheless all might have been remedied from the first, had the Provinces abandoned the beaten path, which has cost them so dear, of *authorizing* whoever may ask them, to do whatever he pleases, and managed their own affairs themselves, like men, like communities, and not like women or children, by means of trustees and agents without responsibility. All might have been remedied if any one, knowing, as I did, the composition of the great army, could have whispered to them—"Be not afraid. That army is immovable. Neither Correntinos nor Entrerianos can be made to penetrate into the interior; if the Porteños of Rosas are dragged to a new war they will revolt, because they long for repose." The prospect of not having to fight or suffer any more, was the hope that animated the whole army, and united the Porteños and the Provincials with those who defended the town of Montevideo, and with the Entrerianos. Above all, what the Provinces were ignorant of was, that all these forces and more, were requisite to oppress Buenos Ayres. If one expeditionary force was moved the rest would revolt. As it now appears, there were about 7,000 men in Buenos Ayres. And have those returned that were sent to Corrientes? It is strange that said expedition has been forgotten, and that no mention has been made of it.

Nevertheless, General, it cannot be credited that the Provinces will intermeddle in what appears a quarrel between Piran and Urquiza. The spirit of clanship, which in the Province occupies the place of patriotism, is sufficient to neutralize every effort. Do not fear that they will come to an understanding among themselves; that before giving an authorization, or offering themselves in soul and body to support what they are told, as long as they are told what they are to support, that they will consult each other what is to be done or what they are to answer. No! in the first flush, they answer "yes; ask more and it shall be given." They serve as a police to each other. When San Juan had rid herself of your good man, Mendoza said, let us replace Benavides; such are the orders from thence: now, should Mendoza choose to act, Benavides would tell them to be quiet, because the public tranquillity so requires. Salta acts the spy on Jujuy; Santiago on Tucuman; Entre Rios on Corrientes; reversing the proverb, "the one hand washes the other, and both wash the face," in this case they defile and bespatter each other. Rosas knew them well, and never troubled himself with sending a courier to them, till he had escaped from the dilemma. Silence was his secret. "When he says nothing, it proves that there is nothing;" such is an axiom of provincial policy. Nevertheless, it would not be superfluous to speak to them at present of the Entre-Rianos, Lagos, Bustos, foreigners, Galan, &c., and especially to keep the foreign press and the diplomatic agents in motion, to keep up a proper spirit, and direct public opinion. The world is composed of fools and knaves; honesty is a rare exception.

You speak of Piran and Madariaga as obscure aspirants. But, General, who elevated Piran and Galan? If the one be obscure to upset the other, his old companion, the fault is Your Excellency's who surround yourself with very obscure men, as Elias, Segui, little Huergo, and the many other manikins you have sent to the Congress; can any thing be more obscure and despicable than the Priest Peña?

In Buenos Ayres it will be said that Benavides is coming with the ten thousand men that Rosas expected to assist him. "If you have not triumphed, General, proceed, persevere; it is so that all matters are managed in that quarter: a beginning is made without knowing when or why, or how or for what purpose: it is continued because it has been begun. At last there are wanting some millions of cattle, some thousands of men, the tears are wiped away, the pools of blood dry up, and on the following day the Restorer, I mistake, the Liberator is authorized to begin anew. Does Buenos Ayres revolt against Galan? Let her be subjected; nothing more natural. If she do not choose, why cut her throat. What astonishes me is, that Piran, the Correntinos, who know Y. E. so well, the battalions and the demagogues do not understand this, which is the a, b, c, of our history.

The same thing has happened in my own case, General: I began, and because I began, continued till I have told the whole truth, without reservation; the truth as when told with God as a witness in heaven, posterity as a judge upon earth, and the gibbet in prospect as a punishment.

It was my purpose to have maintained the silence which I imposed upon myself the day that I wrote to you announcing my departure, and protesting against the first absurdity and the first act of violence. I trusted that, the Republic being constituted, I should return to my family, or to Buenos Ayres, without reproach, and with my head modestly erect. General Piran has done me the incalculable injury of compelling me to abandon all my prospects for the future. I see that triumph must stain our history anew with blood, and I will not go to shake hands dyed with gore still fresh, or to see Buenos Ayres withered, silent, and bent under the weight of her new misfortunes. I see that by means of a fratricidal struggle the Provinces are to be dragged forward to support an impossibility, an anacronism, and I sacrifice myself, like the old soldier of liberty, like the sleeping centry who awakens with the enemy's bayonet at his breast; he shouts out to warn his companions, and perishes.

Accept, General, this sacrifice, which is greater than the eternal resentment which my counsels must produce in you. Believe me, none has cost me so much. I have hesitated, I have watched, I have meditated three days; I have implored heaven to illuminate me. I feel weak, not in the flesh, but in the spirit. Now, *alcea jacta est!* the die is cast! When I hear of your victory over Buenos Ayres, I will ask for a letter of citizenship in Chile, in order to devote myself to popular education, as a vow of self-denial, as an anchorite who renounces society and the world.

I sacrifice myself, General, to the fear that the Argentines may ascribe to me the direction given to the press of Valparaiso, which no longer *screams* fruitlessly, as it *screamed* for ten years in vain against Rosas, according to the official note which Elias passed to me at the Rosario, by order of Y. E. We men are not responsible for our opinions, but before God; history will answer as to their truth and justice: of their morality and sincerity, the precedents of those who write, and the occasion and incentives from which they act.

For me, the dangers, the struggle, when all despair; exile and obscurity after the triumph.

With the unwavering hand wherewith John Hancock signed the Act of Independence of the United States;—

In my own hand writing, and of my own free will and accord:

In my irrevocable character of Representative of the People,

D. F. SARMIENTO,

DEPUTY TO THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUENT CONGRESS;

Unanimously elected by his birth-place, San Juan; though absent in a foreign land, and despite having protested against the violent acts of the victorious General. An election that Benavides attempted in vain to invalidate, forging the signature of a citizen, in order to issue the decree, not finding a Minister who chose to countersign it.

BUENOS AYRES.

After having read Señor Sarmiento's letter, we trust our readers do not expect or require any apology for this Extra Number of the BRITISH PACKET. It is a document that every person, interested in the River Plate question, or in the fate and prospects of these young Communities, ought to read and ponder.

From his position in the Liberating Army, and his daily intercourse with the Commander-in-Chief, the author enjoyed opportunities of observation, that throw a flood of light on the motives and objects that actuated the leader of the enterprise; and reveal the depth of the abyss of suffering and degradation, from which Buenos Ayres escaped, we may say miraculously, or at least providentially, on the 11th Sept.

In the enthusiasm consequent on the victory of Caseros, many forgot for a time how hard, how impossible it is for "the leopard to change his spots;" and Delilah-like, the pseudo-Liberator astutely availed himself of the critical moments of dalliance at the conferences of San Nicolas, "to shear the locks" of the entre Republic, inserting anew in its lacerated mouth, the *gaucho bit* of extraordinary or irresponsible powers. In the dismemberment of its territory, the appropriation of its revenues, the dispersion and exile of its Representatives, and the usurpation of its Government, the Province of Buenos Ayres soon heard the Satanic shout, "the Philistines are upon you!" a shout of horror and extermination, reserved for Corrientes, Santa Fé, Cordoba, and all the others in their turn; each destined to be a holocaust on the altar of the National Directory.

To unmask such aspirants, as Señor Sarmiento has done in the pamphlet befor us, is a service to the cause of humanity; a merit in which we aspire to participate, indirectly and in a minor degree, by reproducing it in our mother tongue. At all events we discharge what we conceive to be an imperative, and feel to be a welcome duty, to the land of our adoption.

After what has taken place, it is morally impossible that General Urquiza can ever preside the destinies of Buenos Ayres or the Argentine Republic; and it is important that all and sundries should impress upon him the salutary, though perhaps unsavoury truth, that his mission as a Statesman is ended,—"that he has cessed to be useful" or needful. Let him retire to private life, and enjoy unmolested the laurels of Caseros. This his bitterest enemies are willing to concede; and more than this his most devoted partizans are not entilled to claim on his behalf. As the Hero of Caseros, the public press hitherto has dealt *leniently* with the foibles and faults of the Provisional Director; but if General Urquiza persist in throwing down the gauntlet to all the world, Sarmiento, Mitre, and others, "quick and cunning at fence," are both prepared and bound to take it up; in which case the *borrowed light* of the ex-Ministers, and the Chargés d'Affaires elect and aspirant, will only serve to render "the darkness visible." As few have nerve to volunteer for the forlorn hope, we earnestly recommend "prudence, as the better part of valour." We should be sorry to pamper to the vitiated taste of the age, by an unnecessary disclosure of the "Mysteries of Entre-Rios;" and we might perhaps have allowed even the present brochure to pass unnoticed; had we not deemed it expedient that the allies, and the *quondam* interventors, should be made fully aware of the gross abuse that has been made of their delegated power. In all cases of intervention, great powers, such as England, France and Brazil, should either rely on their own resources, or watch with a jealous eye, and restrain with a firm hand, the mal-practices of those employed as their tools, or admmitted into their alliances. We, in common with many others, insist on a joint moral solidarity; and if accessory to the evils inflicted on the Province of Buenos Ayres in particular, certainly they are bound to lend their aid and moral countenance in redressing them, and especially in obviating the consequences that threaten to ensue. We have reached a crisis, when an active, enlightened and self-reliant diplomacy is imperatively demanded. *Verbum sat* &c.—

BULLETIN, No. 1.

General Madariaga,
Port of Don Basilio, Nov. 17th, 1852.

To General Don José Maria Flores, Minister of the Department of War and Marine.

Notwithstanding the light winds, the inserviceable state of the Steamer, in consequence of damage sustained, and the want of pilots, for those who came on board as such have shown their incapacity, by the grace of God and the exertions of our mariners and troops, we arrived at this port on the afternoon of the 15th.—

At night-fall I caused General Hornos to disembark with a party of riflemen, who having marched some distance on foot, surprised a guard and killed the Officer in command, who wished to resist. These men mounted, and on the morning of the 16th brought horses with which the greater part of our Cavalry, which was immediately disembarked, were provided. Four hours later General Hornos, at the head of 300 men well mounted, established his camp at three leagues distance from this port, leaving Colonel Ocampo on the coast, with the cavalry which is not yet mounted, but will be so immediately.

The most important operation of the campaign therefore has been effected with complete success.

By the news acquired from different individuals that have been spoken with, the country appears well disposed, the disgust being general against the tyrannical administration of Urquiza. He appears to have set off for the Paraná four days ago, without having attempted any military reunion in these departments of the coast.

Whilst writing, a despatch arrives to me by land, which announces the entry of General Hornos into the town of Gualeguaychú, where the inhabitants declared themselves in favor of the movement.

I will not close this note without transmitting to Your Honour what General Hornos communicates to me, for I expect his written despatch every moment with supplies of beef, which he is to remit for the squadron and the troops on board, with which I will proceed to the Arroyo de la China, the point where I intend to establish my centre of operations with the infantry, artillery and some cavalry which I have deemed necessary.

The chief objects of the operations of General Hornos, are the prisoners, the forwarding of important communications to different parties of the country, as also to the Government of Corrientes, and to make our presence felt in the Country. In my communication to the Government of Corrientes I place myself at its immediate orders.

8 o'clock p. m.

Although the day has continued very tempestuous I have received plenty of meat for the squadron and troops on board. Four hundred of the men who remained on the coast are mounted, and marched immediately to the Estate of Garcia, where General Hornos is encamped.

A hundred more horses which are wanted, and which make up the number for the 900 cavalry that compose the column of General Hornos, are expected this night.

Early to-morrow I expect to effect my movement to Concepcion del Uruguay, when I will communicate every thing of interest that may occur.

God preserve Y. H. many years.

JUAN MADARIAGA.

General Madariaga.
On board the steamer "Merced,"
Port of San Basilio, Nov. 18th, 1852.

To General Don José M. Flores, &c. &c.

I have the satisfaction of enclosing to Y. H. a copy of the note which I have received from General Hornos, whose suggestions I have adopted, considering them opportune.

The wind continuing south west, I expect to be this evening in the Uruguay.

God preserve Y. H. many years.

JUAN MADARIAGA.

Estancia de Garcia, Nov. 17th, 1852.
8 o'clock, p. m.

General Don Juan Madariaga.

I have received yours, and informed of its contents, I acqaint you that immediately, or to-morrow morning early, I shall be in the town of Gualeguaychú, where I shall obtain the horses that are still wanting; but if it be possible for you to send the men who are still there on foot, by the vessels to said town, it will be much better, so as to leave this corner at once, and get mounted with more convenience. With the 400 horses I sent yesterday I fancy very few more will be required.

In consequence of Commandant Fraga's declining to continue in the post which he occupied, I ordered him to assemble the inhabitants to elect his successor for that I in no way interfere in this kind of matters.

I leave all the inhabitants of the rural districts at peace in their homes, stating to them the expediency of their taking an active part in the re-action, which they admit to be useful, asserting that they are very tired, and that they will on no account join Urquiza. At the outset greater co-operation cannot be exacted.

All the communications march to their destinations, including that addressed to the Chief of the Prisoners, who is still the same Commandant Palma. I am informed that the greater part of them are at work with leave of absence, and I suppose the rest are assembled at Calá.

As soon as I have the whole column mounted I proceed to put myself in contact with them, keeping the line of the Uruguay in the direction of Gena.

I will send to-morrow the proclamations which I have ordered to be printed. I will inform you in due course of what may happen.

Your friend, &c.
MANUEL HORNOS.

BULLETIN No. 2 tells us under General Madariaga's own hand, that his division of infantry had suffered a repulse at the Arroyo de la China, on the 21st ult.; and that on the same date, General Hornos had obtained a triumph over a detachment of Urquiza's forces, headed by three or four of his most accredited Generals. Details gleaned from parties that have since arrived direct from Gualeguaychú, fully confirm the news as to the success of General Hornos. In fact he had met with no opposition from the masses; on the contrary, many parties had offered him their services, which he generally declined, recommending them merely to remain quiet, and take no part in favor of Urquiza. With this advice they readily complied, and many of the native families had retired to the woods and forests. Some severe examples had been made to inspire terror; but it is evidently too late. The Entre Rianos are tired of fighting, and General Urquiza must now fall by the very same causes that upset Oribe and Rosas; the discontent and passive resistance of his own forces, favored and incited by the presence of General Hornos.

Of the movements of the Correntinos nothing certain has transpired; but the fact of a preconcorted attack, for the purpose of upsetting the Provisional Directory, is now fully admitted, and the publication of the documents is even announced. It is more than probable that General Hornos may by this time have effected a junction with them, towards the northern frontier of Entre-Rios. By the latest accounts General Urquiza was supposed to be about the sources of the Gualeguaychú, with a small force.

A communication from the Government of Paraguay, gratefully accepts the pacific overtures of our Government, and leaves no doubt as to its absolute neutrality in the pending contest—Of the Interior Provinces nothing is known; but we may rest assured, that they have not moved, and will not move a single man; on the other hand, provincial reactions may be expected in favour of the common cause of liberty. Our evening contemporary announced the significant and laughable fact, that the Sanjuaninos had elected Governor Benavides and his Minister General, as the Delegates for said Province to the Constituent Congress. This is bowing out the gentlemen in question with a good grace; but whether they may find the door open on their return, we do not pretend to say.

PORT OF SAN NICOLAS.—A Decree published on the 29th ult., allows foreign vessels, of 120 tons and upwards, to proceed direct to the port of San Nicolas—The Government of Paraguay has also extended the right hand of fellowship to foreigners, who may shink fit to visit or settle in the South American China. Free ingress and egress are guaranteed; exemption from military service and forced loans; the right of acquiring and disposing of property; liberty of conscience, with certain modifications &c. This is a gigantic step ahead, compared with the lonely isolation, and almost hermetical seclusion of nearly forty years.

LATEST NEWS.

We copy the following from the "Nacional" of this afternoon:—

"By the steamer "Paraná" which has just arrived from Montevideo, we have received communications with date of yesterday, in which they announce, that a small craft had just arrived from Gualeguaychú, ratifying the news of the triumph of Hornos, adding that he was on the frontier of Entre Rios, and that his force now amounts to 4000 men"—

In the same number are given the documents respecting our league with the Province of Corrientes, but we have neither time nor space to give even a synopsis of them. We can only say generally that they are of the most explicit and satisfactory character.

A report has also got into circulation that General Benavides has been ousted from the Government of San Juan, and that Sr. Yanzi, is reinstated in his place. Where so much is said something must be true; and even the Money Market bears its silent testimony, for doubloons are quoted at 272½ current dollars, with a downward tendency.